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Procedural Whipsaw: Allocating the Burden of Proving Reasonable
Notice to Prisoners of Forfeiture Proceedings and the (Renewed) Call
for Actual Notice *
In 2019, the Second Circuit determined that the government should bear the
burden of proving the prison mail distribution procedures it employed to provide
inmates with notice of forfeiture proceedings were constitutionally adequate.
This was the most recent decision involved in a circuit split on this burdenallocation issue, with other circuits dictating that a presumption of adequacy
exists when notice is sent by mail to the inmate’s institution of incarceration.
This Recent Development argues that the Second Circuit was correct in refusing
such a presumption for multiple reasons, including normative and long-standing
legal principles. Moreover, the Second Circuit came to the correct result within
the bounds set by the Supreme Court on this issue, which include the Court’s
previous holding that actual notice is not required in this context. However,
given the distinct circumstances in which inmates find themselves, for a myriad
of reasons, placing the burden on the government is not enough, and actual notice
should be required in this forfeiture context. Longstanding Due Process notice
principles, fairness concerns, judicial economy, and specifically the Court’s
holding in Mathews v. Eldridge, all point to why actual notice should be
required in this context. This discussion occurs against the backdrop of the
troubled civil asset forfeiture system, which is rife with ill incentives for the
government to forfeit the property of its citizens, often without much required in
the way of proof that the property was actually connected to criminal activity.
Given the problems of the civil asset forfeiture system generally, as well as the
factually distinct situations of inmates by virtue of their confinement, at a
minimum the government should bear the burden in this context, but ideally
actual notice should be required.
INTRODUCTION
In 2018, the federal government took in $1.38 billion in proceeds from
asset forfeiture, 1 a process by which the government confiscates a citizen’s
property that allegedly was connected to a crime. Even that extraordinary figure
pales in comparison to the peak numbers from 2014, when the haul was a
staggering $4.47 billion. 2 Additionally, those numbers are only for the federal

* © 2020 Jamison Wynn.
1. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 10-YR SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL REPORT DATA 1 (2020),
https://www.justice.gov/afp/file/10-yr_summary_of_reporting.pdf/download
[https://perma.cc/
CM8M-LML4].
2. Id.
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government. State asset forfeiture income, from the mere fourteen states for
which such data was public, totaled $250 million in 2013. 3
These numbers become troubling, however, when considering actual
circumstances under which property has been seized for the purposes of
forfeiture. 4 A student named Charles Clark had saved $11,000 from financial
aid, various jobs, gifts from family, and educational benefits. He was carrying
the cash with him as he boarded a flight, and after claiming his bag smelled like
marijuana, police officers seized his cash despite not finding any evidence of a
crime. 5 Likewise, Victor Guzman, a church secretary, had $28,500 in churchgoers donations seized by police after he was pulled over while en route to buy
a parcel of land for the church. 6 The cases grow even more concerning from
there. An elderly couple, Mary and Leon Adams, were evicted from their home
by a SWAT team without notice, and then the home was seized, all because
their adult son had sold twenty dollars of marijuana to a confidential informant
(“CI”) on the front porch. 7 The State initiated civil forfeiture proceedings
against the Adams’ home a month later, and the trial court approved the
forfeiture, holding that the State “proved by a preponderance of the evidence”
that a connection existed between the crime and the property solely “based on
the CI’s . . . purchase of narcotics from the property.” 8 In yet another case,
police seized a gold cross from a woman after pulling her over for a minor traffic
violation. 9 Nothing illegal was reported, no criminal charges were filed, and the
woman received no traffic ticket, but her property was still seized. 10
One of the most concerning occurrences is the case of Jennifer Boatright
and her boyfriend, Ron Henderson. The two were pulled over for a minor
traffic violation by police and had $6,037 seized, which was intended for
purchasing a car when they arrived at their destination. 11 The two were taken
to the police station for “fit[ting] the profile of drug couriers,” and the district
attorney told them they could either face charges for money laundering and

3. DICK M. CARPENTER II, LISA KNEPPER, ANGELA C. ERICKSON & JENNIFER
MCDONALD, INST. FOR JUST., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET
FORFEITURE 11 (2d ed. 2015), https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/policing-for-profit-2ndedition.pdf [https://perma.cc/QLY4-W4J4].
4. It is important to note that the following stories are not solely examples involving federal
seizure, even though, for the sake of brevity, this Recent Development focuses on federal forfeiture
statutes and federal forfeiture. Instead, they are simply used for illustrative purposes to detail instances
of seizures that have occurred.
5. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 3, at 8.
6. Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2013/08/12/taken [https://perma.cc/W25E-22BL].
7. Id.
8. Commonwealth v. 2314 Tasker Street, 67 A.3d 202, 205 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013).
9. Stillman, supra note 6.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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child endangerment (and lose their child), or sign over their cash to the city. 12
Boatright and Henderson signed over their cash to avoid losing their child to
Child Protective Services. 13 Later, they brought a class action suit against the
City of Tenaha, Texas, 14 when it was discovered that the city’s police
department regularly employed this policy of “cash-for-freedom” deals to
intimidate people into forfeiting their valuable property. 15
These examples—just a few of the many instances of out-of-control civil
asset forfeiture practices—show the very tenuous connection, at best, that is
required for property to be seized for the purposes of forfeiture. As if this was
not concerning enough, when a state or the federal government initiates a civil
asset forfeiture proceeding, if one does not show up to contest the forfeiture of
their property, then such property can be administratively forfeited, 16 which is
usually accomplished by simple paperwork without any judicial involvement. 17
In these cases, the only entity who makes a seizure determination is the seizing
agency itself, with no judicial review of the merits. 18
And why then, one might wonder, is it problematic that the seizing agency
is the sole determiner of such administrative forfeiture claims? The answer is
simple. At both the state and federal level, these agencies have a massive
incentive to push for forfeiture of any valuable property: they get a sizeable cut
of the proceeds or get to keep the property if it can be used by the agency. 19
Indeed, when the federal government takes property via forfeiture, law
enforcement can keep one hundred percent of the proceeds; the same onehundred percent rule is in effect for law enforcement in twenty-five states. 20
While in the abstract one would hope this incentive would not alter civil asset
forfeiture practices, as seen by the cases above and by the admission of the
entities who use such practices, 21 it undoubtedly has.
Some of the comments from individuals who benefit from civil asset
forfeiture make this starkly clear. One city attorney referred to civil asset

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Morrow v. Washington, 277 F.R.D. 172, 172 (E.D. Tex. 2011).
15. Stillman, supra note 6.
16. The federal government allows administrative forfeiture. Types of Federal Forfeiture, U.S.
DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/afp/types-federal-forfeiture [https://perma.cc/N7XT-QV9N]
(last updated Feb. 28, 2020). This Recent Development does not discuss state administrative forfeiture.
17. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 3, at 12–13; Types of Federal Forfeiture, supra note 16.
18. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 3, at 12–13.
19. See id. at 11–14.
20. See id. at 14.
21. See Sometimes Cops Find Your Stolen Car. Sometimes Cops Stole It, AM. C.L. UNION (Oct.
28, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/video/sometimes-cops-find-your-stolen-car-sometimes-cops-stole-it
[https://perma.cc/822A-L2S3].
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forfeiture as a “gold mine.” 22 A drug task force supervisor was noted as saying,
“We want the cash . . . . Good agents chase cash.” 23 And a city police chief noted
It’s usually based on a need—well, I take that back. There [are] some
limitations on it. . . . Actually, there’s not really on the forfeiture stuff.
We just usually base it on something that would be nice to have that we
can’t get in the budget, for instance. We try not to use it for things that
we need to depend on because we need to have those purchased. It’s kind
of like pennies from heaven—it gets you a toy or something that you
need is the way that we typically look at it to be perfectly honest. 24
While civil asset forfeiture may do some good in deterring crime by imposing
a harsh financial burden, among other potential justifications, 25 these comments
make clear that the motive is all too often filling the coffers of law enforcement
as opposed to actually deterring crime.
Given the huge incentive in place to seize the property of citizens, 26 the
problems with civil asset forfeiture become even more profound when
considering the possibility that some people are unaware their property is at
risk of being forfeited. 27 If someone is unaware that their property is subject to
22. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 3, at 15.
23. Michael Haugen, When Cops Seize Property, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 16, 2016, 8:00 AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/08/civil-asset-forfeiture-unfair/
[https://perma.cc/9UFNA7ZD].
24. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 3, at 15.
25. Roger Pilon, Can American Asset Forfeiture Law Be Justified?, 39 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 311, 318
(1994) (naming as potential justifications taking the profit out of crime, denying criminals the means
of crime, and punishing criminals for crimes they commit).
26. The Arizona Prosecuting Attorney’s Advisory Council exemplified how great the incentive is
in a training presentation document, which stated,
When your bosses can’t find any money in their budget they get depressed. When they get
depressed they tell you to start doing forfeiture cases . . . . When you feel like a winner you
go back to your jurisdiction and just start seizing everything in sight. When you just start
seizing everything in sight you screw up and lose everything. When you screw things up and
lose everything you ruin forfeitures for all of us. Don’t ruin forfeitures for all of us.
CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 3, at 15. In another example, the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement’s Asset Forfeiture Handbook also emphasizes profit maximization as an essential
part of forfeiture decisions: “[The] handbook outlines six key factors agents should consider[, of
which] four involve how much a property is worth.” Note, How Crime Pays: The Unconstitutionality
of Modern Civil Asset Forfeiture as a Tool of Criminal Law Enforcement, 131 HARV. L. REV.
2387, 2392 (2018) [hereinafter How Crime Pays] (quoting Nick Sibilla, Leaked Handbook Reveals
How ICE Uses Forfeiture To Seize Millions, FORBES: #THEVERDICT (Oct. 16, 2017, 1:52 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2017/10/16/leaked-handbook-reveals-how-ice-usescivil-forfeiture-to-seize-millions/#50618fbb498c [https://perma.cc/GW5V-DM87]).
27. It is important to note that this Recent Development is not insinuating that a lack of notice
is a huge problem with every single forfeiture proceeding or that a lack of notice is the only reason
people do not contest these proceedings. There are many reasons to contest a forfeiture, such as a
lack of resources or fear of self-incrimination. See David Pimentel, Civil Asset Forfeiture Abuses: Can
State Legislation Solve the Problem?, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 173, 183 n.55 (2017). Any one of these
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a forfeiture proceeding, and thus does not contest it, their property can be
administratively forfeited with no judicial review, so long as it qualifies as
property that can be administratively forfeited. 28 As is discussed at the end of
Section II.B., such summary forfeitures permit the government to “whipsaw” 29
property owners on the front end by forfeiting property without needing to
prove a connection from the property to the crime and on the back end by
making the forfeiture more difficult to contest. Additionally, such notice
problems are even more concerning when the lack of notice involves a currently
incarcerated citizen, over whom the government—the same entity that is
seeking to forfeit their property—has complete custodial control. In this
context, there is simply no justification for a lack of notice.
This Recent Development proceeds in three Parts. Part I gives a general
overview of forfeiture proceedings. It also discusses how the federal circuit
courts have struggled with what constitutes adequate notice of forfeiture
proceedings to inmates and are currently split on who has the burden of proof.
Part II discusses why the burden of proving adequate notice should always be
on the government in these scenarios, which is why the recent Second Circuit
case on the issue, United States v. Brome, 30 is correct in that regard. Finally, Part
III covers why notice by mail, without more, to an incarcerated inmate is
insufficient, both normatively and legally. It also shows how Mathews v.
Eldridge 31 can help inform this conversation about procedural adequacy, in
addition to the general notice standard from Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co. 32
I. OVERVIEW OF FORFEITURE, ADEQUATE NOTICE, AND
BURDEN OF PROOF
This part informs the discussion by providing an overview of how the
various types of forfeiture work, as well as what constitutes adequate notice in
civil-legal proceedings generally. Then this part considers what constitutes
adequate notice in forfeiture proceedings specifically involving prison inmates
reasons, including lack of notice, could be the reason that the overwhelming majority of federal
forfeitures—around eighty percent—go uncontested. See id.; Alice W. Dery, Overview of Asset
Forfeiture, A.B.A. (June 30, 2012), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/
2012/06/02_dery/#:~:text=The%20vast%20majority%20of%20federal%20forfeiture%20cases%20go%2
0uncontested.&text=Houses%20and%20other%20real%20property,that%20engage%20in%20administr
ative%20forfeitures [https://perma.cc/EEX4-E6YA].
28. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 3, at 12–13. For an explanation of what property can be
administratively forfeited, see infra note 37 and accompanying text.
29. To “whipsaw” someone is to victimize or disadvantage that person in two opposite ways
at once. Whipsaw, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/whipsaw
[https://perma.cc/T4YN-LE4Z].
30. 942 F.3d 550 (2d Cir. 2019).
31. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
32. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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by analyzing the leading case on the issue, Dusenbery v. United States, 33 and the
circuit split that has developed regarding which party has the burden of proving
adequacy of notice to prisoners.
A.

Overview of Forfeiture Generally

There are three types of forfeiture: criminal forfeiture, civil forfeiture, and
administrative forfeiture. 34 While criminal forfeiture requires a criminal
conviction for connected property to be forfeited, civil forfeiture does not
require a conviction. Instead, the government institutes an in rem civil forfeiture
action against the property itself merely for its alleged connection to a crime. 35
In the federal context, for property to qualify as being subject to civil
forfeiture, there must be a proper connection between the property and a crime
for which civil forfeiture is allowed. 36 For most crimes, property that facilitated
the crime, was involved in the commission of the crime, or is representative of
proceeds derived from such criminal activity is subject to forfeiture. 37
Generally, the government has the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that seized property is subject to civil forfeiture. 38 Additionally, if
the government’s forfeiture theory is that the property was used to facilitate or
was involved in the commission of a crime, the government must also establish
that there was a “substantial connection between the property and the
33. 534 U.S. 161 (2002).
34. How Crime Pays, supra note 26, at 2389; Types of Federal Forfeiture, supra note 16. This Recent
Development does not further discuss criminal forfeiture but instead focuses on civil and administrative
forfeiture.
35. How Crime Pays, supra note 26, at 2389.
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 981. This statute provides a general overview of some criminal violations that
subject properly connected property to civil forfeiture. It is important to note that I discuss this federal
statute as well as § 983 to represent the requirements for civil forfeiture in general, though state
forfeiture statutory requirements vary. For a general overview of each state’s civil forfeiture statute, see
generally Asset Forfeiture Laws by State, FINDLAW, https://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-rights/assetforfeiture-laws-by-state.html [https://perma.cc/LGJ7-8XN6] (last updated Feb. 6, 2019).
37. See Karis Ann-Yu Chi, Follow the Money: Getting to the Root of the Problem with Civil Asset
Forfeiture in California, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1635, 1640 (2002); How Crime Pays, supra note 26, at 2389;
Pilon, supra note 25, at 313. Summarizing all the ways property can be connected to crime is especially
complicated considering that there is both no uniform description of property that is subject to
forfeiture for all crimes and that the various forfeiture provisions are spread throughout the U.S. Code.
Stefan D. Cassella, Asset Forfeiture Law in the United States, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF
CRIMINAL AND TERRORISM FINANCING LAW 427, 431 (Colin King, Clive Walker & Jimmy Gurulé
eds., 2018).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). The significance of the preponderance of the evidence standard cannot
be overlooked. This standard, often called the “fifty-one percent standard,” means in the civil forfeiture
context that it is merely more likely than not that the property is connected to a crime—a
relatively low burden to meet. Grading State & Federal Civil Forfeiture Laws, INST. FOR JUST.,
https://ij.org/report/policing-for-profit/grading-state-federal-civil-forfeiture-laws/ [https://perma.cc/
UQR7-NC8D]. All that is required to prevail is evidence slightly better than the odds of a coin flip.
Id. Thirty-one states and the federal government abide by this standard for civil asset forfeiture
proceedings (and some states go even lower, following a probable cause standard). Id.
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offense.” 39 This substantial connection requirement is an attempt to ensure that
“the property must have more than an incidental or fortuitous connection to
criminal activity.” 40 The government may establish a substantial connection by
showing that the property made the criminal act “less difficult or more or less
free from obstruction or hindrance.” 41
The third type of forfeiture is administrative forfeiture, which is a subset
of civil forfeiture. An administrative forfeiture occurs where no claim in protest
is filed by the property owner and the seizing agency can finalize the forfeiture
without judicial review. 42 If a timely claim to the property is filed, however, the
administrative forfeiture ends, and the forfeiture must continue into a judicial
proceeding. 43 Only certain types of property may be administratively forfeited,
including property that is illegal to import; property used to import, transport,
or store a controlled substance; a monetary instrument; and other property that
does not exceed $500,000 in value. 44 Real property cannot be administratively
forfeited. 45
B.

Adequate Notice Principles Generally

Notice is a concept at the heart of procedural due process. Adequate notice
procedures must be employed to inform a party of a proceeding against their
protected interests in order to comply with due process requirements. 46 The
intent behind this notice requirement is to provide citizens with a realistic
opportunity to contest a deprivation of their protected interests. The general
standards that outline what is required for such notice to be adequate are
described below.
The standard for adequate notice comes from the seminal case Mullane,
which held that “[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process
in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
39. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3).
40. United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987, 990 (4th Cir. 1990).
41. Id.; see United States v. 3639–2nd St., 869 F.2d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 1989). While this
“substantial connection” requirement seems to impose an onerous burden, it is quite easy to imagine
how almost any property used in any manner during the commission of a crime could be characterized
as making the crime less difficult to commit or more free from hindrance. See NAT’L CRIM.
JUST. ASS’N, ASSETS SEIZURE & FORFEITURE: A CASE LAW COMPENDIUM 39 (1998),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/180539NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5F7-RXMS].
42. See Dery, supra note 27; How Crime Pays, supra note 26, at 2389.
43. Cassella, supra note 37, at 435–36; How Crime Pays, supra note 26, at 2389.
44. Types of Federal Forfeiture, supra note 16.
45. Dery, supra note 27.
46. Such procedures include notifying parties to the pendency of the action, affording an
opportunity to object, and enabling someone to prevent deprivation of their interests. See Cornell L.
Sch., The Requirements of Due Process, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitutionconan/amendment-14/section-1/the-requirements-of-due-process [https://perma.cc/7JS4-D3GV].
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pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.” 47 Further, “due[] process which is a mere gesture is not due
process.” 48 Rather, when providing notice, one must employ means that “one
desirous of actually informing the absentee” would utilize, given the
“practicalities and peculiarities” of the case. 49 In addition, the adequacy of a
given notice method “may be defended on the ground that it is in itself
reasonably certain to inform those affected.” 50 Where reasonable certainty is
not possible, the method chosen should not be “substantially less likely to bring
home notice” than alternative methods. 51
At issue in Mullane was how a trustee administering a trust needed to
inform beneficiaries of their interest in the trust. 52 Some beneficiaries’
addresses were known while others were not. 53 The Mullane Court held that
“personal service . . . serves the end of actual and personal notice,” but such
service is not required in every circumstance. 54 It was adequate to give notice
by publication to beneficiaries whose addresses were unknown, whereas for
those beneficiaries whose addresses were known, more effort—at least
informing them by ordinary mail—was required. 55 Subsequently, in Mennonite
Board of Missions v. Adams, 56 the Court confirmed the holding of Mullane,
stating that “[n]otice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice
is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely
affect the liberty or property interests of any party . . . if its name and address
are reasonably ascertainable.” 57
Depending on the particular facts of a case, one method of notice may be
required over another. Actual notice, the form of notice which provides for the
strongest procedural protections, occurs when the party providing notice
ensures that the receiving party in fact learns of a legal action. 58 This can be
achieved by the party providing notice physically handing notice to the
receiving party or by sending notice via a third party, who must obtain a record
confirming the receiving party actually got the notice. This is in contrast to
constructive notice, in which a party theoretically has the opportunity to learn

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
notice).

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
Id. at 315.
Id. at 314–15.
Id. at 315.
Id.
Id. at 317–18.
Id.
Id. at 319.
See id. at 317–18.
462 U.S. 791 (1983).
Id. at 800.
W.P. Wade, Actual Notice, 19 AM. L. REV. 73, 74 (1885) (discussing the definition of actual
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of legal action through publication in a public record, such as a newspaper. 59
Providing notice by standard mail falls somewhere in between actual and
constructive notice. Additionally, certified mail goes a bit closer toward actual
notice than normal mail, by providing the sender with a receipt of delivery to
its destination. 60
C.

Adequate Notice of Forfeiture Proceedings to Inmates Specifically,
Before Dusenbery

Receiving notice of forfeiture proceedings is essential in allowing parties
the opportunity to contest the attempted property deprivation. Thus, a
thorough explanation of how notice operates in forfeiture proceedings is key.
In an administrative forfeiture, property “may be forfeited by the seizing agency
if proper notice of the seizure and intent to forfeit is given and no person files
a claim to the property . . . within the allotted time period.” 61 After such a
nonjudicial forfeiture proceeding has concluded, the only ground on which to
attack the forfeiture and have it set aside is for a lack of adequate notice. 62
Although courts have been somewhat inconsistent in their procedural method
of analysis in reviewing the adequacy of notice, they agree that notice is the
only proper ground of review after closure of an administrative forfeiture. 63
59. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15.
60. What is Certified Mail?, USPS.COM (Nov. 9, 2018), https://faq.usps.com/s/article/What-isCertified-Mail [https://perma.cc/7VJF-TVJH (staff-uploaded archive)].
61. Weng v. United States, 137 F.3d 709, 712 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Idowu, 74
F.3d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1996)).
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(1); Rebecca Hausner, Adequacy of Notice Under CAFRA, 36 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1917, 1926–27 (2018). 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(1) provides the requirements for a motion to set
aside forfeiture:
Any person entitled to written notice in any nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding under a
civil forfeiture statute who does not receive such notice may file a motion to set aside a
declaration of forfeiture with respect to that person’s interest in the property, which motion
shall be granted if—(A) the Government knew, or reasonably should have known, of the
moving party’s interest and failed to take reasonable steps to provide such party with notice;
and (B) the moving party did not know or have reason to know of the seizure within sufficient
time to file a timely claim.
This shows explicit statutory consideration of potential notice procedure deficiencies in the context of
nonjudicial forfeiture proceedings. Because inmates can do nothing to ensure they receive notice,
mandating heightened procedural protections in this context is important. While this Recent
Development is principally concerned with due process issues that are relevant under subsection (A)
of § 983(e)(1), subsection (B) of § 983(e)(1) is also problematic. Subsection (B) only requires that the
moving party know about the seizure. Therefore, a party contesting forfeiture will fail under § 983(e)(1)
and be unable to have the forfeiture set aside for lack of adequate notice if they knew about the seizure—
even if they were completely unaware of the forfeiture proceeding itself.
63 . The cases are somewhat convoluted here, so an explanation is in order. Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 983(e)(5), a § 983(e) motion is the exclusive remedy to set aside an administrative forfeiture lacking
“reasonable notice” as outlined in § 983(e)(1). However, courts differ on how they procedurally analyze
such notice claims, whether via the statutory vehicle or not. Compare United States v. Brome, 942 F.3d

99 N.C. L. REV. 247 (2020)

256

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99

Accordingly, the protections provided by adequate notice are important in the
forfeiture context generally, but especially when it comes to administrative
forfeitures. After the administrative proceeding is complete, courts cannot
conduct a review of the forfeiture on the merits but, instead, may only review
procedural deficiencies concerning a lack of adequate notice, which leaves a
great deal of room for mistake. 64 Additionally, but in a different manner,
completed judicial civil forfeitures may also be contested after the fact for notice
deficiencies. 65
In the context of apprising inmates of such forfeiture proceedings
specifically, the standard for providing adequate notice has often been debated.
Prior to Dusenbery, some circuits held that actual notice to inmates who were
potential parties to forfeiture proceedings was required. 66 Other circuits held
550, 552–53 (2d Cir. 2019) (analyzing whether both statutory notice requirements and general due
process principles are complied with under § 983(e)), Mesa Valderrama v. United States, 417 F.3d
1189, 1196–98 (11th Cir. 2005) (same), Payne v. United States, 2012 WL 12905298, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 30, 2012) (same), United States v. Weimer, 2006 WL 562554, at *3–5 (E.D. Penn. Mar. 7, 2006)
(same), and Bermudez v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 2008 WL 3397919, at *3–6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2008)
(same), with Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 165–174 (2002) (invoking equitable powers to
review whether adequate notice was provided), United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664, 670 (3d Cir.
2000) (same), and Walker v. U.S. DEA, 2002 WL 1870131, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2002) (using a
federal civil due process notice analysis without using the § 983(e) procedural vehicle). Regardless,
well before § 983(e) went into effect in August 2000, it had already been established that administrative
forfeitures can only be contested after the fact if they are deficient of statutorily required or due
process-required notice. See McGlory, 202 F.3d at 670 (“A district court ordinarily lacks jurisdiction to
review . . . [the merits of] administrative forfeiture proceedings”); United States v. Woodall, 12 F.3d
791, 793 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he federal courts have universally upheld jurisdiction to review whether
an administrative forfeiture satisfied statutory and due process requirements.”); Sarit v. U.S. DEA,
987 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1993) (“Whereas most challenges to [administrative] forfeiture would be
foreclosed by . . . failure to utilize the [statutory] mechanism, courts have entertained challenges to the
adequacy of notice, reasoning that the mechanism is not available to a plaintiff who is not properly
notified of the pending forfeiture.”). This long-established principle was ultimately enacted by statute
in § 983(e). Thus, while § 983(e) is the proper procedural vehicle for relief, courts sometimes utilize
other procedures for analyzing the adequacy of notice. See Hausner, supra note 62, at 1938 (“Though
the procedure for administrative forfeitures is laid out plainly in CAFRA, district courts may exercise
some judicial discretion by entertaining constitutional challenges after property is summarily forfeited
to the government.”).
64. Hausner, supra note 62, at 1919.
65. See United States v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 156–57 (3d Cir. 2000)
(explaining that although the forfeiture of claimant’s property was void for lack of sufficient notice,
claimant would still have to pursue further proceedings to recover his property because a motion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) is not a claim for the return of property); Keszthelyi v. United
States, 2011 WL 1884007, at *12–19 (E.D. Tenn. May 17, 2011) (detailing how to contest lack of notice
after a concluded judicial civil asset forfeiture proceeding); United States v. Madden, 95 F.3d 38, 40
(10th Cir. 1996) (confirming much of the procedure mentioned in Keszthelyi for contesting a judicial
forfeiture proceeding, although not specifically covering notice). The procedure for contesting notice
as it relates to a completed judicial proceeding is different from an administrative proceeding because
§ 983(e) does not apply to forfeitures conducted judicially. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(e).
66. See Weng, 137 F.3d at 710 (“We conclude that at least when a property owner is in federal
custody on the very charges that gave rise to the seizure of his property, absent special justifying
circumstances, notice of forfeiture sent to him at the federal institution will not be deemed sufficient
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that simply mailing notice of the forfeiture proceeding to an inmate at the
prison facility constituted sufficient notice. 67
D.

Adequate Notice of Forfeiture Proceedings to Inmates Specifically, Under
Dusenbery

The question of what measures are required for forfeiture notice to
inmates to be adequate under the Due Process Clause ultimately reached the
Supreme Court. In Dusenbery, an individual’s house was raided, and the FBI
seized cash found during the raid. 68 The FBI sent notice of an administrative
forfeiture proceeding by mail to the individual at his institution of incarceration
and, after receiving no response, turned over the cash to the U.S. Marshals
Service. 69 The Dusenbery Court noted that the main question in forfeiture cases
where notice is contested is whether notice of the forfeiture comports with the
Due Process Clause, which requires the government to provide notice that is
“reasonably calculated under all the circumstances” to apprise prisoners of the
pendency of a forfeiture action and afford them an opportunity to contest it. 70
The Court went on to hold that actual notice to inmates was not required
in the context of asset forfeiture proceedings. 71 The Court stated that mail
addressed to the petitioner at the penitentiary was “clearly acceptable” 72 because
although the mail goes through the extra step of prison internal delivery, that
does not in and of itself make mailing notice constitutionally inadequate. The
Court concluded that the seizing agency’s use of the prison mail distribution
system described was reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise the petitioner of the action. 73 “Due process require[d] no more.” 74

unless actually received by him.”); Woodall, 12 F.3d at 794–95 (“[F]undamental fairness surely requires
that either the defendant or his counsel receive actual notice of the agency’s intent to forfeit in time to
decide whether to compel the agency to proceed by judicial condemnation.”).
67. The First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have all held that a presumption of adequate
notice exists when notice is sent via certified mail to the proper prison facility. See Whiting v. United
States, 231 F.3d 70, 76–77 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Tree Top, 1997 WL 702771, at *1–2 (6th
Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); Chairez v. United States, 355 F.3d 1099, 1101–02 (7th Cir.
2004); United States v. Clark, 84 F.3d 378, 381 (10th Cir. 1996).
68. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 163.
69. Id. at 164.
70. Id. at 168.
71. See id. at 170 (“We note that none of our cases cited by either party has required actual notice
in proceedings such as this.”).
72. Id. at 172 (“Short of allowing the prisoner to go to the post office himself, the remaining
portion of the delivery would necessarily depend on a system in effect within the prison itself relying
on prison staff.”).
73. Id. at 173.
74. Id. at 172–73.
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Adequate Notice of Forfeiture Proceedings to Inmates Specifically,
After Dusenbery

While, momentarily, it seemed as if Dusenbery had definitively resolved
the questions surrounding adequacy of notice to inmates of forfeiture
proceedings, a split among the circuits has persisted on a related question: which
party to a proceeding contesting notice has the burden of proving the adequacy
or inadequacy of notice given by certified mail? Indeed, the Eighth Circuit
explicitly noted this split: “Dusenbery does not address the question of whether
courts need to inquire into prisons’ mail-distribution procedures, so it is not
controlling on this point.” 75 The First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have
generally continued to use a seemingly irrebuttable presumption that adequate
notice exists when notice is sent via certified mail to the proper prison facility
(absent evidence that the seizing agency actually knew of prison mail delivery
system deficiencies). 76 Thus, in those jurisdictions, once certified mail is sent to
the correct prison, the government does not have to prove adequate prison mail
distribution procedures, and the inmate has no ability to introduce evidence to
the contrary. The Eighth Circuit uses a similar but slightly different standard
by employing an explicitly rebuttable presumption that delivery of notice by
certified mail is adequate, which places the burden on the inmate contesting
notice to prove inadequacy of prison mail delivery systems. 77
Under the two standards named above, when notice is sent to an inmate
by certified mail, and thus a presumption of adequate notice arises, the burden
is placed on the inmate contesting notice to prove either that the seizing agency
had knowledge of inadequate prison mail delivery systems (if irrebuttable) or
that the prison employed inadequate internal mail distribution systems (if
rebuttable). Regardless of which form the presumption takes, overcoming it is
a high bar to meet.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Third and Fourth Circuits have
declined to apply any presumption that adequate notice exists. Rather, they
place the burden directly on the government to show that the prison’s internal
procedures for delivering mail are reasonably calculated to notify the prisoner. 78

75. Nunley v. Dep’t of Just., 425 F.3d 1132, 1138 (8th Cir. 2005).
76. See Whiting v. United States, 231 F.3d 70, 76–77 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Tree Top,
1997 WL 702771, at *2 (6th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); Chairez v. United States, 355 F.3d
1099, 1101–02 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Clark, 84 F.3d 378, 381 (10th Cir. 1996). The Seventh
Circuit most explicitly employs an irrebuttable presumption. See Chairez, 355 F.3d at 1101 (refusing to
“inquire into the details of [the] internal mail delivery systems of jails and prisons”).
77. Nunley, 425 F.3d at 1137–38.
78. See United States v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 2000); United
States v. Minor, 228 F.3d 352, 358 (4th Cir. 2000).
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II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT CORRECTLY REFUSED ANY PRESUMPTION OF
ADEQUATE NOTICE IN UNITED STATES V. BROME
In United States v. Brome, 79 the inmate challenged notice of an
administrative forfeiture proceeding against $21,019 of his property after the
administrative proceeding had concluded. 80 Brome and his wife had been
stopped by police, pulled out of their car, and searched for weapons because
Brome was on parole, at which point the police seized their cash. 81 The property
was taken via administrative forfeiture by the DEA after notice was sent to
Brome’s place of incarceration and no claim in protest was filed. 82 The Brome
court, after noting the current circuit split on burden of proof, sided with the
Third and Fourth Circuits in holding that the government has the burden of
proving adequacy of prison mail distribution systems. 83 The court ultimately
held that the government met its burden by showing the prison had adequate
procedures in place to reasonably apprise Brome of the forfeiture action, akin
to those approved in Dusenbery. 84
This part advances the discussion by explaining various reasons why the
Second Circuit was correct in refusing any presumption of adequate notice:
First, the Dusenbery Court suggested that prison mail distribution systems
should be inquired into for purposes of determining adequacy of mailed notice.
And second, normative considerations, as well as a settled legal principle
regarding burden shifting, dictate that the burden of proving adequate prison
mail distribution procedures should be on the government.
A.

The Supreme Court in Dusenbery Suggested Courts Should Inquire into
Adequacy of Notice via Prison Mail Distribution Systems

First, the irrebuttable presumption that notice is adequate when certified
mail is delivered to a prisoner’s institution of incarceration, adopted by the
Seventh Circuit in Chairez v. United States, 85 must be disposed of as an incorrect
understanding of Dusenbery. While the Seventh Circuit is correct that Dusenbery
does not explicitly mandate an inquiry into the adequacy of prison mail
distribution systems, 86 a plain reading of the Dusenbery majority’s reasoning
leads to the inescapable inference that courts should inquire into internal mail
distribution procedures in some manner. When determining if notice to the
79. 942 F.3d 550 (2d Cir. 2019).
80. Id. at 551–52.
81. Id. at 551.
82. Id. at 551–52.
83. See id. at 553.
84. See id. at 554.
85. 355 F.3d 1099 (7th Cir. 2004).
86. The Seventh Circuit’s reading of Dusenbery, that there is no explicit requirement that courts
inquire into internal mail distribution procedures, was adopted by the Eighth Circuit as well. See
Nunley v. Dep’t of Just., 425 F.3d 1132, 1138 (8th Cir. 2005).
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inmate in Dusenbery was constitutionally adequate under Mullane, the Dusenbery
Court did not stop after determining that certified mail was sent to the correct
prison. 87 Instead, the Dusenbery Court did a deep dive into information
provided by the government about the measures in place to promote proper
mail delivery to inmates, 88 ultimately concluding that the FBI’s use of the
thoroughly examined mail distribution procedures was constitutionally
adequate under Mullane. 89 It seems quite illogical that the Supreme Court
would do a thorough examination of the mail distribution procedures in place
and determine that use of such procedures resulted in the FBI’s method of
notice by mail being constitutionally adequate, only to not hold lower courts to
the same level of examination. 90 While the Dusenbery majority held the use of
mail sent to the inmate at the correct prison was “clearly acceptable,” the Court
also continued and explicitly noted that the seizing agency’s “use of the [mail
distribution] system described in detail” made the agency’s method of notice
sufficient under the Mullane reasonableness standard. 91
Additionally, while ultimately rejecting the Seventh Circuit’s sweeping
declaration that Dusenbery did not require any inquiry into prison mail
distribution systems, the Eighth Circuit concluded instead that Dusenbery did
not address this question one way or the other, and thus it was not controlling
on this issue. 92 The only source the Eighth Circuit cited for this notion 93 was

87. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168–69 (2002).
88. Id. The Court explained:
The FBI sent certified mail addressed to petitioner at the correctional facility where he was
incarcerated. At that facility, prison mailroom staff traveled to the city post office every day
to obtain all the mail for the institution, including inmate mail. The staff signed for all certified
mail before leaving the post office. Once the mail was transported back to the facility, certified
mail was entered in a logbook maintained in the mailroom. A member of the inmate’s Unit
Team then signed for the certified mail to acknowledge its receipt before removing it from
the mailroom, and either a Unit Team member or another staff member distributed the mail
to the inmate during the institution’s “mail call.”
Id. (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 172–73.
90. Beyond the analysis of Dusenbery, fairness concerns abound if such an irrebuttable
presumption is applied. In such a case, it would be irrelevant if a prison had wholly inadequate
procedures in place or had numerous complaints of inmates not receiving mail. Under the irrebuttable
presumption, so long as the certified mail is received by the prison and the seizing agency did not make
itself actually aware of such inadequacies, the conclusive presumption applies. Additionally, the
Seventh Circuit’s concern that inquiring into distribution systems would be “burdensome,” Chairez v.
United States, 355 F.3d 1099, 1101, is overstated. See Nunley, 425 F.3d at 1138.
91. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 172–73.
92. Nunley, 425 F.3d at 1138 (“Finally, we find Chairez’s invocation of Dusenbery unpersuasive.
Dusenbery does not address the question of whether courts need to inquire into prisons’ maildistribution procedures, so it is not controlling on this point.”).
93. Id.
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footnote five of R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul. 94 The footnote, in pertinent part,
states that “[i]t is of course contrary to all traditions of our jurisprudence to
consider the law on this point conclusively resolved by broad language in cases
where the issue was not presented or even envisioned.” 95 However, this
assertion seems to be quite a stretch when applied to the Dusenbery Court’s
analysis of the issue. While it is true that the Dusenbery petitioner did not
specifically present the issue of whether courts should inquire into prison mail
distribution procedures, 96 it can hardly be said that the language used by the
Dusenbery Court was simply “broad language” in a case where the issue was “not
. . . even envisioned.” 97
First, the petitioner in Dusenbery, as well as the government, both clearly
“envisioned” this issue in their respective arguments, as the Petitioner cited
unreliable internal mail procedures as one reason notice by mail was
constitutionally inadequate, 98 and the government cited the procedures in place
as evidence supporting the reasonableness of its notice under Mullane. 99 Both
parties plainly “envisioned” that distribution procedures should be inquired into
as they are relevant to determining the reasonableness of the notice employed.
Second, the Dusenbery Court considered the specific details of the prison’s mail
distribution procedures and relied on that inquiry to hold that use of that mail
distribution system was “reasonably calculated” under Mullane. 100 For these
reasons, while the circuits obviously disagree on what exactly Dusenbery
prescribes, it seems clear that, at a minimum, the issue was indeed “envisioned”
by the Court and parties. Therefore, while the Court did not explicitly mandate
94. 505 U.S. 377, 386–87 n.5 (1992). This case is about First Amendment jurisprudence, an issue
unrelated to the topic of this Recent Development. See id.
95. Id.
96. Brief for Petitioner at i, Dusenbery, 534 U.S. 161 (No. 00-6567), 2001 WL 521455, at *i.
97. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386–87 n.5 (1992). Additionally, specific presentation of a given issue in
the parties’ arguments does not seem to be an overriding concern of the Supreme Court, considering
the Court often strays from the parties’ specific arguments when deciding cases. See Timothy Macht
& Derek Borchardt, Can Courts Introduce Legal Issues Not Raised by the Parties?, LAW.COM (July 2, 2020),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/07/02/can-courts-introduce-legal-issues-not-raisedby-the-parties/?slreturn=20200907201222 [https://perma.cc/ZZU9-ALFC].
98. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 97, at 15–16, 2001 WL 521455, at *15–16 (“[A]lthough the
Government, through the testimony of one mailroom employee, introduced evidence of the procedures
in place at the prison for handling certified mail, it offered nothing to show that the procedures were
followed or effective in this case, or in general. . . . [T]he lower courts held that the procedures were
constitutionally adequate based on their intuition about fairness, notwithstanding the absence of any
evidence to show that the procedures worked in reality—that is, evidence that the procedures used did
not carry an undue risk that a forfeiture notice sent to the prison would not be delivered to the inmate
for whom it was intended.”) (citations omitted).
99. Brief for the United States at 11, Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002) (No. 006567), 2001 WL 811711, at *11 (“[T]he BOP's current mail procedures and the record in this case
convincingly demonstrate that mailing a forfeiture notice to the inmate at his prison is ‘reasonably
calculated’ to reach the inmate.”).
100. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 172–73.
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such an inquiry, at a minimum, the Court’s language clearly implies that lower
courts should conduct the same analysis in this context, and thus, that an
irrebuttable presumption of adequacy is an incorrect standard.
It is true that the Dusenbery Court was reviewing a grant of a summary
judgment motion, and thus the movant, the government, bore the burden at
that stage of proving “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 101 While one could
argue that this high standard of proof at summary judgment is why the
Dusenbery majority went beyond simply analyzing proof that the notice was
mailed to the correct prison and inquired into the mail distribution procedures
in place, there would be no reason for the Court to do so. If the Dusenbery
majority believed, as the Seventh Circuit held, that an irrebuttable presumption
was the correct standard to follow when notice is mailed to the correct prison
and that the inquiry should end there, the inquiry would have stopped. If the
Dusenbery Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit, then even with the high
standard of proof at the summary judgment stage, proof of certified mail
reaching the prison would be all that is required to show no reasonable trier of
fact could find for the nonmovant that notice was unreasonable.
Instead the Court continued to analyze the mail distribution procedures
in place at the prison. This suggests that the procedures must be analyzed in
order to fully show the notice method employed by the government (certified
mail) is “reasonably calculated” under Mullane. 102 Thus, because the Second
Circuit in Brome followed the Dusenbery majority’s analysis by inquiring into
the prison mail distribution procedures, thereby refusing such an irrebuttable
presumption of adequacy when notice is mailed, the Second Circuit came to the
correct result. 103
Now that we have funneled the discussion away from an irrebuttable
presumption that completely disregards the adequacy of prison mail

101. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). To grant summary judgment, a court must be satisfied that no
reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986).
102. Indeed, Justice Ginsberg went even further in her dissent, arguing that the assertion that the
government showed the mail distribution procedures used were adequate was groundless, for the
government did not introduce anything to show the reasonableness or reliability of the mailroom to
cell delivery at the prison at the time of the relevant forfeiture. See Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 180
(Ginsberg, J., dissenting). This gives further support to the assertion that the notice method used by
the government can only be “reasonable” under Mullane if the relevant prison’s mail distribution
procedures are adequate. Only after they are inquired into and found to be adequate will certified mail
be “reasonable.”
103. The Third and Fourth Circuits also placed this burden on the government. See United States
v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Minor, 228 F.3d
352, 358 (4th Cir. 2000).
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distribution systems, 104 we turn to which party must prove the adequacy of such
mail distribution systems. 105
B.

Normative and Legal Considerations Dictate That the Government Should
Prove Adequacy of Notice Through Prison Mail Distribution Procedures

By refusing a rebuttable presumption of adequacy, the Second Circuit in
Brome also supported a long-standing principle of law that conveys why the
government should bear the burden of proving adequacy of notice via its prison
mail procedures. 106 The principle, originally stated in United States v. New York,
New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 107 reads as follows: “It is well settled that
in the interest of fairness the burden of proof ordinarily resting upon one party
as to a disputed issue may shift to his adversary when the true facts relating to
the disputed issue lie peculiarly within the knowledge of the [adversary].” 108
However, this well-settled principle of law, explicitly stated by the
Supreme Court on multiple occasions 109 is “qualified” in certain
104. Such as the conclusive presumption explicitly adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Chairez, 355
F.3d 1099, 1101 (7th Cir. 2004).
105. Only one circuit has explicitly adopted the standard that an inmate must overcome a
rebuttable presumption by proving inadequacy of mail distribution systems. See Nunley v. Dep’t of
Just. 425 F.3d 1132, 1138 (8th Cir. 2005). Other circuits have adopted the standard that the onus is
entirely on the government to prove the adequacy of notice by showing adequate mail distribution
systems. See United States v. Brome, 942 F.3d 550 (2d Cir. 2019); One Toshiba Color Television, 213
F.3d at 155; Minor, 228 F.3d at 358.
106. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit in Nunley made passing mention that this doctrine could
potentially be relevant in the context of inmates suing for inadequate notice of forfeitures, specifically
regarding who has the burden of proving adequacy. See Nunley, 425 F.3d at 1138. While the Nunley
court summarily concluded that, ultimately, the doctrine was inapplicable, for the reasons displayed in
this section, fairness dictates that the doctrine should apply in this context.
107. 355 U.S. 253 (1957).
108. United States v. Hayes, 369 F.2d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 1966).
109. See, e.g., United States v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 355 U.S. 253, 256 n.5
(1957) (“‘Such information is peculiarly within the knowledge of plaintiff (respondent) and/or the
initial carrier . . . .’ The ordinary rule, based on considerations of fairness, does not place the burden
upon a litigant of establishing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of his adversary.”); Selma, Rome
& Dalton R.R. v. United States, 139 U.S. 560, 566–67 (1891). In Selma, the Court stated that
as the fact of payment or non-payment by the Confederate government was peculiarly within
the knowledge of the claimant o[r] within his power—if in the power of any one—to establish,
it may well be supposed that Congress intended that a claimant, as a condition of payment by
the United States, should show that his demand belonged to the class for which the act of 1877
provided. But there was no proof on the subject by the plaintiff, nor does it appear, if that fact
were material, that such proof was impossible. It prepared the case and went to a hearing upon
the theory that it was entitled to judgment, upon proof simply of the services rendered, unless
the United States showed that the claim in suit had been, in fact, paid by the Confederate
government. We cannot accept that interpretation of the act.
Id. The principle can be traced back further still. See Greenleaf’s Lessee v. Birth, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 302,
312 (1832) (“That in many cases the bur[d]en of proof is on the party within whose peculiar knowledge
and means of information the fact lies, is admitted.”). Further, in a 2014 case, the Supreme Court noted
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circumstances. 110 This qualification arose in Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 111
where a child’s parents challenged the adequacy of a school district’s
individualized education program (IEP), which was guaranteed by law for
certain students, such as their child with special needs. 112 The Supreme Court
held that the burden of proof remained with the parents asserting inadequacy,
reasoning: “[While s]chool districts have a ‘natural advantage’ in information
and expertise . . . schools [are obligated] to safeguard the procedural rights of
parents and to share information with them . . . .” 113 The Schaffer Court then
pointed out the procedural safeguards in place to protect parents’ right to
information, including the ability to review all school records about their child
as well as the right to an independent educational evaluation of their child by
an expert if they disagree with the school’s evaluation. 114 The Court ultimately
reasoned, due to those protections, that “[parents] are not left to challenge the
government without a realistic opportunity to access the necessary evidence, or
without an expert with the firepower to match the opposition.” 115 Additionally
the Court described other protections in place, including that school districts
must answer a parent’s complaint in writing, provide their reasoning behind the
contested school action, provide details about other IEP options considered,
and describe all evaluations, reports, and other factors the school used to decide
on the IEP in question. 116 The Schaffer Court concluded that the protections
“ensure that the school bears no unique informational advantage” over the
parents. 117
The above analysis from the Supreme Court makes clear the circumstances
under which the rule originally stated in New York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad Co. is so “qualified.” 118 In such circumstances where one party who
would normally bear the burden of proof on an issue is at an informational
disadvantage to their adversary, this alone is not enough. This exception to the
general rule will only apply when a party truly lacks the information
“peculiarly” in possession of their adversary.

the language from New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. was an exception to the general rule
that plaintiffs have the burden of proving the facts establishing the elements of their claim. See
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, 571 U.S. 191, 202 (2014).
110. See Greenleaf’s Lessee, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 312.
111. 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
112. Id. at 52–53.
113. Id. at 60 (citation omitted).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 61.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 60–61.
118. United States v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 355 U.S. 253, 256 n.5 (1957) (“The
ordinary rule, based on considerations of fairness, does not place the burden upon a litigant of
establishing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of his adversary.”).
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Another case illustrates this burden of proof principle even further. In
Browzin v. Catholic University of America, 119 a tenured engineering professor sued
his former university employer for breach of contract, claiming they did not do
everything possible to find him another “suitable position” at the university,
which was required by law. 120 While this was not a ground the court ultimately
decided on appeal, after citing the rule from New York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad Co., 121 the D.C. Circuit noted the possibility that the burden of proof
on the issue was allocated incorrectly and explicitly stated that the university
was “plainly” in a much better position to know “what efforts were or were not
undertaken to find for [the plaintiff] another post within the University.” 122
The applicability of the burden-shifting rule to the Browzin case is further
supported by a case out of the Ninth Circuit. In United States v. Cortez-Rivera, 123
the plaintiff sued the government for damage that occurred to his vehicle as a
result of a search. 124 After citing the rule from New York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad Co., the court held that
placing the burden on the government would require that it prove a
negative fact—that the search did not affect the vehicle’s safety or
operability. ‘[A]s a practical matter it is never easy to prove a
negative. . . . For this reason, fairness and common sense often counsel
against requiring a party to prove a negative fact, and favor, instead,
placing the burden of coming forward with evidence on the party with
superior access to the affirmative information.’ 125
The court reasoned that the plaintiff claiming damage in this case was clearly
in a better position to know the condition of the vehicle prior to the search, and
thus the extent of the resulting damage after, because the plaintiff was aware of
the defects the car already had. 126 On the other hand, the government had no
way of knowing what defects the car had prior to the search, and thus had no
way of “proving a negative”—that there was no damage caused. 127
Schaffer, Browzin, and Cortez-Rivera all indicate exactly why the burden of
proving the adequacy of prison mail systems should be placed firmly on the
government in the context of forfeiture cases. First, placing the burden on the
plaintiff-inmate in such cases would do exactly what Browzin (impliedly) and
Cortez-Rivera (explicitly) warned against: it would require the plaintiff to

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

527 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Id. at 844–45.
See N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 355 U.S. at 256 n.5.
Browzin, 527 F.2d at 849–50.
454 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1041.
Id. at 1041–42 (quoting Sissoko v. Rocha, 440 F.3d 1145, 1162 (9th Cir. 2006)).
Id.
Id.
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“prove a negative.” Just like the government in Cortez-Rivera would have had
to prove a negative (that there was an absence of damage to the vehicle), inmates
in proceedings to set aside a forfeiture for lack of notice, if bearing the burden,
would also be required to prove a negative (the nonexistence of adequate prison
mail systems that reasonably ensure notice is provided). Just as the government
in Cortez-Rivera would have little way of knowing if anything on the car was
damaged as a result of the search or instead damaged prior to the search, the
inmate in proceedings to set aside a forfeiture would have little, if any, way of
knowing the inner workings of the prison mail facility procedures and thus
would have no way of showing, absent a particularized and isolated incident
(which would be insufficient to prove the overarching procedures are
inadequate), the facts required to prove inadequacy. The same concern was seen
in Browzin because the professor had no way of knowing the facts surrounding
what actions were taken to find him another job at the university and thus would
have no way of proving how those steps were inadequate.
Secondly, in accordance with the general rule from New York, New Haven
& Hartford Railroad Co., placing the burden on an inmate in proceedings to set
aside a forfeiture would require them to establish facts peculiarly within the
knowledge of their adversary. Again, in these types of proceedings, the
government is plainly in the better position to establish facts proving the
adequacy of its own systems, as opposed to an inmate who has little, if any, idea
how the systems internally function. While the government could easily have a
prison official testify as to the particular steps in the mail delivery process, as
an official in Dusenbery did, 128 an inmate has no real access to that internal
information in order to show how the systems are inadequate. Moreover, not
only is the government simply in a better position to demonstrate the adequacy
of its systems, but how a given prison’s internal mail distribution system
functions is knowledge “peculiarly” in the government’s possession. Thus an
inmate is entirely dependent on the government to provide accurate and
relevant information in order to make a case for inadequate notice procedures.
Not to mention inmate movement is extremely restricted, and prison officials
would likely be unreceptive to any requests for additional information. If
anything, the only information an inmate may be aware of is what the very last
stage of mail delivery looks like, when they are physically handed their mail.
Additionally, in the case where inmates contest forfeiture for a lack of
notice, the facts are not present, as they were in Schaffer, to show informational
128. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 165–66 (2002) (“[The prison official] testified that
he signed the certified mail receipt for the FBI’s notice to petitioner regarding the cash. He also
testified about the procedures within [the prison] for accepting, logging, and delivering certified mail
addressed to inmates. [The official] explained that the procedure would have been for him to log the
mail in, for [the inmate’s] ‘Unit Team’ to sign for it, and for it then to be given to [the inmate].”)
(citations omitted).
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symmetry between an inmate and the government. Instead, there is a huge
resource imbalance between the two parties regarding access to the relevant
evidence. While in Schaffer the parents were able to review all the school’s
records about their child, were entitled to an independent review of their child’s
needs, and were entitled to receive an explanation of the reasoning behind the
school’s contested decisions, 129 an inmate in a proceeding to set aside a forfeiture
is entitled to no similar protective measures to ensure they are sufficiently
informed about the prison mail delivery system. 130 There is clear asymmetry in
access to such information. Thus, given that the protections which
“disqualified” the parents in Schaffer from the burden-shifting rule are not
present in the context of an inmate contesting forfeiture, such inmates are “left
to challenge the government without a realistic opportunity to access the
necessary evidence”—exactly what the Schaffer Court warned against. 131
Finally, and from a normative standpoint, if the government truly believes
its forfeiture of an inmate’s property is justified and truly intended to provide
notice, the government should be required to show that adequate mail delivery
procedures were in place to reasonably ensure notice. After all, the government
initiates administrative forfeiture proceedings. If an inmate actually receives
notice and challenges the action, it would be converted into a judicial action,
and the government, as plaintiff, would be required to prove a connection
between the property and a crime. 132 The government should not be allowed to
not only skirt its burden of proof through administrative forfeiture 133 but then
also have that forfeiture upheld by throwing the burden on an inmate in the
second instance when they contest the adequacy of notice. 134 Considering the
concern the government has with getting whipsawed in other circumstances,
such as in the collection of tax income for example, 135 it should not be allowed
129. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 60–61 (2005).
130. This Recent Development is not arguing a complete discoverability problem. Certainly, an
inmate could gain some information regarding internal prison mail distribution systems during a formal
discovery process. However, this does not, in and of itself, ameliorate the concerns necessitating the
burden-shifting rule. The resource imbalance between prisoners and the government was displayed in
both an unreasonable search case, Cortez-Rivera, 454 F.3d at 1041–42, and a breach of contract case,
Browzin v. Cath. Univ. of Am., 527 F.2d 843, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Surely both the government in
Cortez-Rivera and the professor in Browzin could have obtained information to help them prove their
respective cases through some form of discovery, yet the resource imbalance as far as access to the
relevant information resulted in the salience of burden-shifting doctrine in Browzin and its application
(in the negative) in Cortez-Rivera. If the burden of proof is placed on the inmate, they will be entirely
dependent on the cooperation of the government to provide the information necessary to carry the
burden, the same entity who financially benefits from the forfeiture of the inmate’s property.
131. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 61.
132. See supra Section I.A.
133. See supra Section I.A.
134. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Whipsaw concerns arise for the government when
two taxpayers have claimed the same benefit. If the government allowed both, it would be unable
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to flip the script and whipsaw inmates on the front end by taking their property
without adequate notice and on the back end by making it harder to contest.
This is especially troubling when considered against the backdrop of the massive
financial incentives in place for the government to seize property that
encourages overreach. 136
III. WHY THE DUSENBERY COURT WAS WRONG THAT MAIL PROVIDES
ADEQUATE NOTICE AND THE UTILITY OF MATHEWS V. ELDRIDGE
This part contributes to the discussion surrounding adequate notice of
forfeiture proceedings to prisoners by showing why actual notice should be
required in this context, as the petitioner in Dusenbery argued. 137 Section A
covers why actual notice best meets the principles prescribed by Mullane.
Section B discusses how, simply from a fairness standpoint, actual notice should
be required. Section C lays out why judicial economy favors actual notice.
Finally, Section D covers how the three factors announced in Mathews v.
Eldridge lend support for actual notice.
A.

Actual Notice Best Complies with General Due Process Notice Principles in the
Inmate Context

To restate the general notice standard from Mullane, “[a]n elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections.” 138 Accordingly, the particular
circumstances of a given case should dictate what level of notice is required; one
should not gloss over specific facts that lend themselves to requiring more (or
less) strenuous notice procedures. While the Supreme Court in Dusenbery held
actual notice was not required to inmates whose property is subject to a
forfeiture proceeding, given the particular facts and circumstances involved in
such a case, actual notice should be required. The Mullane Court also stated that
“process which is a mere gesture is not due process. The means employed must
be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably
adopt to accomplish it.” 139 While the Dusenbery majority made only one passing

to collect tax income from either party. See Harvey S. Gilbert & Steve Mather, Whipsaw Revisited,
43 TAX L. 343, 343–44 (1990); IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL pt. 5, ch. 20, § 6 (2017),
https://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/irm_05-020-006#idm140576771453648
[https://perma.cc/MW5ZS25A].
136. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
137. See generally Brief for Petitioner, supra note 97, at 12–25, 2001 WL 521455, at *12–25 (arguing
for actual notice in prisoner forfeiture proceedings).
138. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
139. Id. at 315.
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note of this key phrase from Mullane, as Justice Ginsberg noted in her dissent, 140
the phrase is crucial when considering the facts and circumstances surrounding
forfeiture proceedings involving inmates’ property.
The facts and circumstances involved in a typical civil litigation scenario 141
where notice is required, and those of an inmate whose property is subject to a
forfeiture proceeding, are two worlds apart. If a party is attempting to provide
“reasonable notice” to their counterparty in a given situation, the Mullane
Court’s holding suggests that when the person’s location of residence is known,
resorting to anything less than the mail is inadequate. On the other hand, when
the person’s location is not known or reasonably ascertainable, constructive
notice by publication is sufficient. 142 However, an “average” situation in which
the recipient’s location of residence is known is factually quite distinct from that
of an inmate. Notice by mail in the former situation is reasonable under the
circumstances because it is common for the average citizen to check their own
mail; requiring more (such as personal service) could be rife with problems,
considering people often leave their places of residence, sometimes for extended
periods, or move.
The circumstances—specifically the exact known location—of an inmate
make all of the typical justifications for notice by mail when location of
residence is known disappear. As Justice Ginsberg noted, the government,
which is “attempting” to provide notice to such an inmate, knows exactly where
the inmate is at all hours of the day; 143 they know based on government records
exactly which prison they are at, and, if need be, their exact location within the
prison could be ascertained by a phone call to the facility. These circumstances
are plainly different than those of the typical situation described above because,
while a free citizen can leave their “known” location, an inmate has no such
luxury by virtue of their confinement and thus cannot frustrate attempts to
provide actual notice. Given these particularly salient facts, it seems obvious
that “one desirous of actually informing the absentee” would simply ensure that
actual notice of the forfeiture proceeding was received.
Additionally, while the Dusenbery majority pointedly stated that due
process does “not require . . . heroic efforts by the [g]overnment,” 144 no such
heroic efforts are required here. A simple acknowledgement by the inmate that
they received the notice of forfeiture proceedings by mail would meet the
requirements of actual notice. The majority was also concerned that requiring
actual notice to inmates could be a slippery slope leading to requiring actual
140.
141.
inmate.
142.
143.
144.

See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 173 (2002) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
By typical civil litigation scenario, I mean a situation in which one of the parties is not an
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317–18.
See Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 174 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 162 (majority opinion).
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notice to all those “in the custody of the government.” 145 The majority provided
the example of active-duty military members, who are technically in the custody
of the government while they are serving, both at home and overseas. 146 This
example hardly supports the slippery slope argument, as the circumstances of
an incarcerated inmate are still distinguishable: the majority of military
members are not confined in the government’s custody in the same sense as an
inmate. While quite often military members are required to be certain places or
else face court-martial, they also can go off base during nonworking hours, take
leave for vacation or family obligations, or be in the process of changing base
assignments. While true that a military member who is actively deployed to a
war zone will be much more controlled than one who is stationed at home or in
a friendly country, as a whole, military members are far less accounted for.
There is little risk of a true slippery slope, even accounting for a more controlled
deployment context, as the sheer numbers indicate. 147 In sum, while the concern
justifying notice by mail is still present with others in the “custody” of the
government, such as military members, that concern is irrelevant with inmates,
whose exact location is always known.
B.

Fairness Dictates that Actual Notice Should Be Required for Inmates

While someone not in confinement has the ability to check the mail at
their known residence for notice of proceedings, inmates have no such ability
and depend entirely on the internal mail systems of the prison for such delivery
of notice. 148 Given that inmates are in the custodial control of the government—
the same entity that is trying to forfeit their property—and that they can do
nothing themselves to check for notice of such proceedings, they should not be
at risk of administrative forfeiture due to lack of notice when they are dependent
on the forfeiting entity for such notice. Additionally, given that such inmates
may have no one else to safeguard their property rights, unlike the beneficiaries
with unknown locations in Mullane, this concern is even greater. 149

145. Id. at 170.
146. Id.
147. Of the roughly 1.3 million active duty military members, as of 2016 only around 193,000 are
deployed overseas, with an even smaller portion deployed to an active war zone. Kristen Bialik, U.S.
Active-Duty Military Presence Overseas is at its Smallest in Decades, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/22/u-s-active-duty-military-presence-overseas-is-atits-smallest-in-decades/ [https://perma.cc/2E5L-K5HB]. Additionally, that number will shrink even
further when considering that few of those deployed to an active war zone will be subjected to a civil
suit such as a forfeiture proceeding. Cf. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at n.5 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“It is at
least doubtful, however, that a soldier, oblivious to a pending action, would return home to find her
property irrevocably forfeited to her Government because she had the misfortune to be in a combat
zone too long.”).
148. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 179 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 178.
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Additionally, many prisons have already implemented procedures that
ensure inmates get actual notice, such as requiring prisoners to sign a log
acknowledging their receipt of legal mail. 150 The viability of this practice has
received support from Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) Regulations, 151 and
the Bureau of Prisons Mail Management Manual explicitly states that an
inmate’s signature is required on incoming certified mail. 152 While this BOP
regulation does not require confirmation of actual notice by inmate signature,
it clearly contemplates this as a feasible option for ensuring inmates actually
receive their legal mail, and the BOP Mail Management Manual confirms that
federal prisons are expected to abide by this procedure. 153 Thus, an agency
pressing for forfeiture of an inmate’s property could easily take advantage of
these procedures by verifying compliance to ensure its notice cannot be
defective, as far as the method of notice is concerned. After actual notice has
been documented, the agency can simply request the documentation be
forwarded to them, to keep for future reference in the event a notice challenge
is raised.
The Second Circuit illustratively summarized these fairness concerns in
Weng v. United States: 154
at least where the owner [of forfeited property] is in federal custody on
the very charges that justify a federal agency in seeking the forfeiture,
there is no undue hardship to the agency in insuring [sic] that the ownerprisoner actually receive the legally required notification. When such an
investigating agency wishes to secure such a prisoner’s cooperation in
testifying against some important wrongdoer, it has no difficulty
delivering the message in a manner that insures receipt. On the other
hand, when the agency employs the administrative procedure to forfeit
up to a half million dollars of the prisoner’s property, it is content to use
the mails, with no assurance that the notice will reach the addressee. 155

150. See id. at 180–81; United States v. Brome, 942 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 2019).
151. 28 C.F.R. § 540.19(a) (2018) (“[Prison s]taff shall mark each envelope of incoming legal mail
(mail from courts or attorneys) to show the date and time of receipt, the date and time the letter is
delivered to an inmate and opened in the inmate’s presence, and the name of the staff member who
delivered the letter. The inmate may be asked to sign as receiving the incoming legal mail.”).
152. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, MAIL MANAGEMENT MANUAL § 4.9(b)
(Apr. 5, 2011), https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5800_016.pdf [https://perma.cc/9C9A-3NY4].
153. Justice Ginsberg made note of both the BOP Manual policy as well as the BOP regulation as
clear evidence of the viability of improved procedures requiring inmates to sign for certified mail.
Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 180 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
154. 137 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1998).
155. Id. at 715.
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Judicial Economy Weighs in Favor of Actual Notice

Because the only way to contest an administrative forfeiture after the fact
is to claim inadequacy of notice, 156 if the government provides actual notice
(which as stated above, is relatively simple in this context), then after-the-fact
claims that such a forfeiture was improper (which would have to allege notice
deficiencies) could be dismissed, either for failure to state a claim or on a motion
for summary judgment. 157 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
motion to dismiss a plaintiff’s claim will be granted where that claim constitutes
a “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 158 For a plaintiff to
overcome a motion to dismiss, “[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 159
Additionally, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 160
Here, assuming actual notice is adopted as the standard in this context and
that a document signed by an inmate to record receipt would be considered
proof of actual notice under this standard, then no valid claim can exist over an
inadequate method of notice when such actual notice has been provided and
documented. An inmate would be unable to assert a nonfrivolous claim that the
method of notice used by the government was unreasonable, so long as the
government consistently followed such documentation procedures. 161 Even so,
if an inmate did attempt to allege deficient notice in a proceeding to set aside a
forfeiture, but a signed receipt existed as evidence of actual notice, then any
allegation that the method of notice was improper would fail. While evidence
extrinsic to the complaint typically cannot be considered in the context of a
12(b)(6) motion (except in very specific circumstances), and thus the signed
receipt should not be considered at that stage, the government could petition

156. 18 U.S.C. § 983(e) (2018).
157. For examples of cases where a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal
Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) was used as a valid ground to attack a plaintiff’s claim that a forfeiture
should be set aside for lack of adequate notice, see Walteros v. DEA, No. 17-23641, 2018 WL 555515,
at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2018); King v. Does, No. 07-4155, 2009 WL 6849444, at *1–4 (D.S.C. Jan. 14,
2009), aff’d, King v. DEA, No. 6:07–CV–4155, 2009 WL 6849443, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 3, 2009), aff’d,
King v. Does, 331 Fed. App’x. 242 (4th Cir. 2009).
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
159. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
554, 570 (2007)).
160. Id.
161. It would seem that the only nonfrivolous dispute that could still exist would be an inmate’s
claim that the procedures employed were unreasonable because the guards forged inmate signatures on
the receipts. However, competent evidence must be presented to show a genuine dispute at this stage,
and it is unlikely that such evidence would exist.
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the judge for admission of this extrinsic evidence for rebuttal purposes. 162 If the
evidence is admitted, the motion would typically be converted into a motion
for summary judgment, 163 at which stage the claim would fail because, with a
signed receipt as evidence of actual notice, no reasonable trier of fact could find
for the nonmoving party as the procedures employed were “reasonably
calculated” to provide notice under Mullane. 164 In sum, actual notice is always a
sufficient method of notice, and thus, so long as the notice sent was timely per
the relevant forfeiture statute, actual notice will ensure virtually no lengthy
dispute over the adequacy of notice can exist. 165
D.

The Mathews v. Eldridge Factors Lend Support for Actual Notice

In the seminal case Mathews v. Eldridge, the plaintiff’s disability benefits
were terminated, and he claimed the administrative procedures in place for
making that determination were constitutionally inadequate. 166 The plaintiff
asserted that his benefits should have been reinstated pending the outcome of a
hearing regarding termination. 167 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that
the procedures in place satisfied due process and no pre-deprivation hearing
was required. 168 The Court held the procedures were adequate because (1)
disability benefits are not based on financial need and a terminated recipient
could apply for welfare, (2) the disability eligibility determination mostly turns
on routine evaluations of data which reduces error, and (3) the costs of
providing a pre-deprivation hearing would be high. 169
This holding created the three-prong Mathews test, which helps courts
determine the constitutional adequacy of procedures currently in place under
the Due Process Clause. Courts balance three considerations:

162. Joel A. Blanchet & James J. Doody, The Use of Extrinsic Documents in a Motion To Dismiss,
LEXOLOGY (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a99ddbc7-1043-46d9aecd-9acff311759c [https://perma.cc/PS56-LP6F].
163. Id.
164. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
165. To address a potential counterpoint, it could be argued that adopting an actual notice standard
in this context is foreclosing an inmate’s ability to contest what they believe to be improper methods.
This is because, so long as a signed writing is obtained to document receipt, adequate notice is
established and there is no avenue left to contest the forfeiture proceeding. Nevertheless, it seems that
providing actual notice would do more to protect inmates from the potential shortcomings of failed
internal prison mail distribution systems rather than forgoing this standard because of the risk of receipt
of actual notice somehow being forged by the prison.
166. 424 U.S. 319, 319–20 (1976).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 321.
169. Id. at 339–49.
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First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation 170 of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 171
For clarity, the “procedures” that are the topic of this section are those
employed to provide notice to inmates of forfeiture proceedings. While the
current procedure approved by the Supreme Court in Dusenbery is to mail
notice, this Recent Development is asserting that under Mathews, the procedure
should be improved so that the government is required to ensure actual notice
to an inmate of a forfeiture proceeding.
The Dusenbery majority refused to consider the Mathews factors based on
the understanding that the more simplistic test from Mullane 172 was the correct
test for determining what method of notice is constitutionally adequate. 173
However, the Mullane opinion makes note of several factors that should be
considered alongside the general test to determine the notice required,
including “the nature of the interests involved, the likelihood that others
similarly situated will protect a property owner’s interests, and the
reasonableness of imposing more onerous requirements on the entity obligated
to give notice.” 174 Essentially, the Dusenbery majority rejected the Mathews
three-factor test, when in reality Mullane, the case relied upon, covers roughly
the same factors, just not stated as explicitly. 175 Indeed, the only factor from
170. Erroneous deprivation is essentially the idea that one is mistakenly and wrongfully deprived
of their interest through the procedures currently being used. The risk of erroneous deprivation, if
present, demonstrates why additional heightened procedures are necessary.
171. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
172. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950).
173. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167–68 (2002). The Dusenbery Court was arguing
that the Mullane “reasonableness” test is proper for determining if the method of notice employed was
constitutionally adequate, whereas the Mathews test would be more proper for determining the “dictates
of due process,” such as when notice is required to satisfy due process (in the above example, predeprivation versus post-deprivation). See Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1242 (11th Cir. 2003).
174. Weng v. United States, 137 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–
20).
175. While stating the three considerations from Mullane somewhat differently, the petitioner in
Dusenbery made this connection, but the Court summarily rejected the argument that Mathews applied.
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 5, Dusenbery, 534 U.S. 161 (No. 00-6567), 2001 WL 950934, at *5. The
petitioner in Dusenbery also cited a D.C. Circuit case which explicitly stated that it was error for
Mathews not to be utilized in this notice context. Id. at 7, 2001 WL 950934, at *7 (citing Lepelletier v.
FDIC, 164 F.3d 37, 45–46 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). Specifically, the Lepelletier court stated that the form of
notice “depends upon a balancing of the competing public and private interests involved, as defined by
the now familiar Mathews factors.” 164 F.3d at 46. Additionally, academic articles and some courts
have noted that the considerations under Mathews and Mullane are essentially the same. See James v.
City of Dallas, 2003 WL 22342799, at *15 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2003) (finding that the choice of test
between Mullane and Mathews did not affect the outcome of the analysis); Salt Lake City Corp. v.
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Mullane that doesn’t explicitly track to a Mathews factor is “the likelihood that
others similarly situated will protect a property owner’s interests.” However,
taking a conceptual leap back, in the context of Mullane, with this factor the
Court was concerned about ensuring that if some people did not receive notice,
other similarly situated plaintiffs would protect their interests. 176 This is
essentially preventing erroneous deprivation, the second Mathews factor. Thus,
it seems to be that the decision relied upon to decide Dusenbery—Mullane—
already covers the three Mathews factors, and thus they are appropriate to
consider in this context.
At the outset of the Mathews analysis, it is important to note that the
petitioner in Dusenbery argued Mathews applied, and thus conducted a detailed
Mathews analysis. 177 The Supreme Court did not accept this argument and
instead applied Mullane. What follows are the strongest arguments under each
factor, which ultimately support the notion that procedures ensuring actual
notice to inmates should be required under Mathews.
The first Mathews factor considers the private interests that would be
affected by the government action—here the inmates’ property interests that
would be affected by a forfeiture proceeding. Inmates with property involved
in forfeiture proceedings have a significant interest in retaining their property.
As recognized by the Supreme Court, property is a significant, constitutionally
protected, fundamental right. 178 Given that private property is a fundamental
right that cannot be taken by the government without due process of law, an
inmate’s interest in their private property that may be forfeited is very
significant. Thus, this factor weighs heavily in inmates’ favor. Indeed, this is
even truer when considering the amount of property that can be forfeited under
certain civil forfeiture statutes—under one such statute regarding property
connected to narcotics, up to $500,000 of property could be administratively
forfeited. 179
The second Mathews factor concerns the risk of erroneous deprivation of
the private interest involved and the value of substitute procedural safeguards.
Under this factor, while the risk of erroneous deprivation is not extremely high
under current Supreme Court-approved procedures which consider mailing
Jordan River Restoration Network, 99 P.3d 990, 1007 n.9 (Utah 2012) (“But Mullane, as applied by the
Court, is notably similar to Mathews.”); Philip P. Ehrlich, A Balancing Equation for Social Media
Publication Notice, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 2163, 2178 (2016) (“Although Mathews and Mullane use different
language, both cases create the same cost-benefit test for courts to evaluate whether parties provided
the best notice practicable.”).
176. Mullane, 338 U.S. at 310.
177. Brief for Petitioner, Dusenbery, 534 U.S. 161 (No. 00-6567), 2001 WL 521455, at *12–25.
178. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 510–511 (2005) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
386, 388 (1798)) (“[T]he Framers[ had an] understanding that property is a natural, fundamental right,
prohibiting the government from “tak[ing] property from A[] and giv[ing] it to B.”).
179. Weng, 137 F.3d at 714.
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notice to a prison as adequate notice (so long as some distribution procedures
are in place), the risk is still quite present, and substitute procedures would have
great value in terms of procedural protections. The risk is still present because
inmates have to rely on a prison mail delivery system over which they have no
control. Prison employees only conduct mail delivery as an ancillary part of
their job, secondary to their security functions, so is likely not an important
priority as far as timeliness or accuracy are concerned. 180 Under currently
approved procedures, inmates are solely relying on prison employees accurately
handling their legal mail between receipt and delivery, as well as when
delivering their mail from mailroom to inmate, with no way to verify the
mailroom to inmate delivery is reliable. 181 Justice Ginsberg highlighted this risk,
stating:
Today’s decision diminishes the safeguard of notice, affording an
opportunity to be heard, before one is deprived of property. As adequate
to notify prisoners that the Government seeks forfeiture of their
property, the [majority] condones a procedure too lax to reliably ensure
that a prisoner will receive a legal notice sent to him. 182
In this context, the erroneous deprivation prong is concerned specifically
with how the contested procedures used at the time of the initial deprivation
promote wrongful deprivation of the private interest involved. In addition,
there is an important related issue that retroactively contributes to potential
erroneous deprivation under those procedures. The risk of erroneous
deprivation is much greater in jurisdictions that follow a presumption of
adequacy when notice is mailed, which requires the inmate to bear the burden
of proof when contesting forfeiture after the fact. This is because, in those
jurisdictions, unless an inmate can prove a prison employs generally inadequate
mail distribution procedures, or that the government actually knew a prison
employed inadequate procedures, the inmate will have no opportunity to
contest a forfeiture on the merits, regardless of whether they actually received
notice or not.
For example, under the current Supreme Court-approved notice-by-mail
procedure, assume an inmate did not receive notice of a forfeiture proceeding
against their property due to a failure in the prison mail distribution process,
and thus the property was administratively forfeited. In this scenario, the only
way for the inmate to even have a chance of proving the property was
wrongfully forfeited would be to first successfully petition a court to have the
forfeiture set aside for lack of notice, which in jurisdictions that apply a
presumption of adequacy will require the inmate overcoming the burden of
180. See Nunley v. Dep’t of Just., 425 F.3d 1132, 1137–38 (8th Cir. 2005).
181. See Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 182–83 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 173.
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proof in that proceeding. In effect, this presumption retroactively contributes
to the erroneous deprivation risk under the Supreme Court-approved notice by
mail procedure: the risk of erroneous deprivation which exists due to inmate
dependency on accurate mailroom-to-inmate delivery, is retroactively increased
because a lack of notice will result in no adjudication on the merits of the
forfeiture if the inmate cannot carry the burden of proving generally inadequate
mail distribution procedures. In sum, the notice by mail procedure can cause a
wrongful deprivation, and then that deprivation cannot be cured unless the
inmate first carries the burden, thus making the notice by mail procedure more
likely to promote erroneous deprivation in those presumption jurisdictions.
Additionally, substitute procedures that would ensure actual notice,
including something as simple as having inmates sign a log for their certified
mail, 183 would guarantee they are apprised of forfeiture proceedings against
their property. This would make the risk of erroneous deprivation practically
nonexistent, excusing the low burden of proof issues in civil judicial forfeiture
proceedings 184 because now an inmate will be aware of and thus can contest the
forfeiture. Thus, the forfeiting agency could simply request the record of the
acknowledgement signature be forwarded to them to show actual notice was
received, which makes this additional safeguard extremely valuable, at little to
no additional cost.
The third Mathews factor is concerned with the government’s interest and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional safeguard would entail.
Under this factor, the government does have an interest here in timely and
efficient disposition of forfeiture proceedings; however, simply requiring actual
notice would in no way materially affect such timely disposition. Simply
requiring inmates to sign an acknowledgement form for legal mail would
effectively take no time at all. 185 The only true time delay this might cause is
when an inmate actually exercises their rights to contest the forfeiture of their
property in court (instead of not doing so, and it likely being administratively
forfeited without judicial review). Likewise, the cost of these additional
procedures which would ensure actual notice to inmates is negligible: all that is
required is a few extra seconds to procure a signature of acknowledgement and
to send that acknowledgement to the forfeiting agency.
While the government also clearly has an interest in deterring crime by
forfeiting allegedly connected property, this interest will not be hindered at all
183. As noted, many prisons already employ this very practical method. See supra notes 150–53 and
accompanying text.
184. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining how the typical burden of proof standard
for the government is simply by preponderance of the evidence).
185. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 182 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (noting all that would be required is for
the prison employee “to linger for the additional moments required to secure for each delivery a
signature in a logbook”).
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by requiring actual notice. If an inmate receives notice and contests the
forfeiture, the government will simply have to prove the property can be validly
forfeited. If the government cannot carry the burden in that proceeding, then
forfeiture of that property would not serve the interest of deterring crime
because there was not a sufficient connection between the property and the
alleged crime to justify taking that property from its owner.
CONCLUSION
Going forward, if Dusenbery continues to remain the law, which is
probable, 186 then the presumption of adequacy when notice is mailed to a prison
should be done away with, as the Second Circuit did in Brome. For the reasons
stated, the government should have to prove adequacy of prison mail
distribution procedures in order to support the validity of the forfeiture.
However, normatively and legally, actual notice should be required
specifically in proceedings involving inmates. This Recent Development
offered many reasons, one of the most important being the utility of the
Mathews factors and how they point towards requiring actual notice. Given the
flaws of the civil forfeiture system generally, this method ensures the most
protection for inmates who are subjected to forfeiture proceedings. Essentially,
a requirement of actual notice correctly substitutes the substance of procedural
due process (reasonable protection of citizens from inadequate procedures) over
its current form (that actual notice typically does not apply).
Although the Supreme Court was clear in Dusenbery that actual notice is
not required—thus expressly abrogating cases like Weng from the Second
Circuit—there is still hope that actual notice could be a viable option in the
context of notice of forfeiture proceedings to inmates. However, given the
current constraints put in place by Dusenbery, it would be wise for the Supreme
Court to take on a case that resolves the current circuit split and expressly refuse
any presumption of adequacy.
JAMISON WYNN

186. This is probable because the Supreme Court has never required actual notice in the civil
context. See id. at 171 (2002) (majority opinion).

